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I 
CHAPTER ONE 
Culture and the reflexive subject 
in systemic psychotherapy 
A ny history or geneal~gy m,:st remain incomplete, because it depends on the starting pomt of the author and how much context he or she includes. History and genealogy are them-
selves contingent, and I do not pretend to be able to offer a compre-
hensive account of the life of Teflexivity in systemic psychotherapy. I 
do offer punctuations, which I hope will give food for thought. Much 
hinges on what we consider a system to be. Do we consider a system 
to be like a mechanical or a physical body; or a language structure 
with attnbutes, which wholly or partially exists outside the conscious-
ness of the persons who engage in it? Or do we consider a system to 
be a series of transactions with attributes which are wholly accessible 
and transparent to those who consciously are engaged or choose to be 
engaged in it? Or a bit of both? Arid what are the implications for 
reflexivity of these two positions?' 
An incomplete history of reflexivity in systemic psychotherapy 
A historical account of reflexivity in relation to cultural differences in 
systemic psychotherapy must begin with Bateson and particularly 
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with his two postscripts (1936 and 1958) to his ethnographic study 
Naven (Bateson, 1958; Krause, 2007). This starting point also allows us 
to draw parallels between systemic psychotherapy and anthropology. 
I think that we want to do so not only because Bateson was an anthro-
pologist, but also because there are similarities in what systemic 
psychotherapists and ethnographers do. For me this also articulates 
two feelings of bewilderment. The first relates to my discovery (as an 
anthropologist) that Bateson's ethnographic work among the Iatmul 
people, despite yielding extraordinary insights (Bateson. 1972a; Bergel;; 
1978; Nuckolls, 1996; Strathern, 1988; Wilder-Mott & Weakland, 1981), 
held no interest for trainers and teachers of systemic psychotherapy 
during my own training twenty years ago. The second relates to the 
mOre recent disappearance of the concept or the idea of a "system" 
from much teaching and writing in systemic psychotherapy. This is a 
subversion, because one way or another" and whichever particular 
school of systemic psychotherapy one follows, the notion of "system" 
is still a central assumption, theory, Or concept in the discipline: It is 
what distinguishes us from other psychotherapies. 
"Schismogenesis" has also virtually disappeared from our vocab-
ulary and our training. It is Bateson's term and it appeared first as a 
description of gendered processes of interaction in New Guinean 
Iatmul society generally and'inone Iatmul ritual in particular. In 1936, 
Bateson described schismogenesis as U a precess of .differentiation in 
the norins of individual behaviour resulting from cumulative interac-
tion between individuals" (Bateson, 1958, p.175). I have discussed the 
details of how Bateson arrived at this description elsewhere (Krause, 
2007). Here, r want to reiterate the difference between this early 
deScription of schismogenesiS and a later one. This later deScription 
defined schismogenesis in a new language as 
An implicit recognition that the system contains an extra order of 
~omplexity due to the combination of learning with the interactions of 
persons. The schismogenic unit is a two person subsystem. This 
subsystem contains the potentialities of a cybernetic circuit which 
might go into progressive change; it cannot therefore be conceptually 
ignored and must be descnbed in a language of a higher type than any 
language used to descnbe individual behaviour. [Bateson, 1958, p. 297J 
This second definition moved the description of relational dyna-
mics from aJevel of synchrony, as a kind of "snapshot" of the relation-
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ship between relationships, to one of a short-term process in which 
change could be captured through the notion of feedback, learning 
and learning how to learn, and where the explanation of any given 
behaviour or communication could be explained by the context in 
which it is taking place (Bateson, 1958, p. 200; Krause, 2007, p. 122). 
There is, however, another difference between the two ideas of schis-
mogenesis, which speaks mOre clearly to our present concern with 
reflexivity. In 1936, and in his ethnographic fieldwork, Bateson had 
been preoccupied with the thought that how he interpreted his field-
work data might not be how the Iatmul themselves would interpret it. 
The question was, how could he be sure that his own interpretation 
was correct, or even relevant? Be concluded that he could not be sure 
and that, in fact, no one can be Sure because the way anyone explains 
any bit of culture depends on one's own point of view. This is 
Whitehead's idea of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness", referring 
. to observations being presented as if they are "hard" or objective data, 
instead of points of view (Whitehead, 1925). 
This dilemma did not mean that Bateson gave up on contributing 
to a framework for the understanding of human nature. He continued 
to think about his own position vis-ii-vis that which he was observing 
(Bateson, 1972a,b,c,d, 1979; Bateson & Bateson, 1987), but his immedi-
ate legacy to systemic Or family therapy became the idea of recursive-
ness as a generic ingredient of human relationships and systems. In 
systemic psychotherapy, this cybernetic understanding led to a 
language of meta-orders, meta-systems, and abstractions, rather than 
an interest in how local details might contribute to this process and be 
understood as part of it (Dell, cited in Hoffman, 1981, p. 343). The role 
and influence of the observer-therapist became akin to that of a con-
troller or assessor looking in, interpreting, perturbing, or strategizing 
from the outside. This was in keeping with Bateson's observation 
from 1958 that the categories he used to describe Iatmul society were 
unequivocally processes of knowing adopted by social scientists. It 
was also in keeping with the prevailing structural-functionalist 
approach in British social anthropology at the time, in which societies 
and social systems were considered to be, if not steam engines, like 
organisms with patterns and processes, which are no.t, at least not 
entirely, transparent to those who participate in them. 
However, neither anthropologist nOr therapist can work without 
the acknowledgement. of contact with their interlocutors, and in 
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anthropology this tension between theory and practice was most 
clearly articulated in the ethnographic research method of "partici-
pant observation" .. III this method, the ethnographer lives wi~ and 
learns the language of, people she is studying and takes part in daily 
tasks and rituals, talks to people about what they are doing, observes 
activities and communications, takes notes about it all, and keeps a 
personal diary. The complexity of this method and the similarity with 
systemic psychotherapy were not lost on therapists (Andersen, 1991; 
Anderson & Goolishian, 1988; Bertrando, this volume; Hoffman, 1981; 
Tomm/1984). At one stage, the Milan team divided their trainees into 
two groups, the supervision "S" group and the observation "0" group 
(Hoffman, 1981; Tomm, 1984), articulating and perhaps anticipating 
the debates and the developments that were to come. The method of 
participant observation does not, of course, in itself exclude the ther-
apist or the ethnographer considering herself outside the system. 
Anthropology had matured under colonialism and, therefore, had 
been under the protection of administrators and tax collectors, who 
often made use of ethnographic data. Similarly, the therapist's recog-
nition of a need to "join" a system (Minuchin & Fishinan, 1981) is not 
necessarily coterminous with the therapist understanding what goes 
on in this system or being able to see the world from her client'spoint 
of view. llldeed, an acknowledgement that the communication pat-
. terns in a famlly affect and even draw in the therapist was considered 
to be an advantage for the therapist in aiming to beat (or cure) the 
famlly at its own game (Selvini Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 
1978; Selvini Palazzoli, Cirillo, Selvini, & Sorrentino, 1989). 
The continuum of positions, from being outside the observed 
system to becoming a member of it, captured the struggles and the 
dilemmas in the development of, and thinking about, reflexivity 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. It was realized fairly early that the 
analogy of the homeostatic steam engine for social systems was unsat-
isfactory (Dell, 1982; Dell & Goolishian, 1981; Hoffman, 1981) and that 
. if a famlly system is seen as evolving and only to appear to be stable, 
then the therapist, whether she is inside or outside the system, will not 
know the future course of it and, therefore, her task is one of facilita-
tion rather than direction (Tomm, 1984). The three guidelines 'of 
hypotheSizing, circularity, and neutrality described by the Milan team 
conveyed this much less directive activity of the therapist (Selvini 
Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1980) and the idea of evolution 
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of social systems also challenged the structural-functionalist notion of 
a system and a society as a tightly integrated whole. This did not 
mean, pace Bateson, that aspects or levels of a system could not be 
recursively related in either coherence or in contradiction, as ill double 
bind theory (Bateson, 1972e), and this recursiveness in the interaction 
between different parts of the system as experienced by persons in it, 
continued to be articulatecL for example, in the way the Milan team 
thought about and developed circularity. III this vein, Tomm, embrac-
ing Cecchin's emphasis on curiosity (Cecchin, 1987) used the term 
"reflexivity" to refer to a type of question: 
Reflexive questions are questions asked with the intent to facilitate 
self-healing in an individual or 'family by activating the reflexivity 
among meanings within pre-existing belief systems that enable family 
members to generate or generalize constructive patterns of cOgnition 
and behavior. [Tomm, 1987b, p. 172J 
From the client's point of view, such a question might help to 
consolidate a new choice by orientating a person towards perceptions 
held by other persons or in other parts of the system, which might 
help support this new choice. The perceptions and meanings 
expressed by individual persons are contingent upon, but are not seen 
to be determined by, the system. From the point of view of the thera-
pist, a reflexive question is a type of question which can be used along 
with other types of questions (Tomm, 1988) and although such a ques-
tion might guide the therapist herself to become more creative and in 
this way more facilitative, it is considered to be a strategy. The thera-
pist can see things that the clients cannot see, and she knows, if not 
about what change should look like, about how to ask. She has a 
choice about which intervention to use, as Tomm extensively des-
cribed (Tomm, 1987a,b, 1988), but an examination of the circumstances 
of her own perception and meanings, although of interest (Tomm, 
1988, p. 14), was kept at arm's length. The reflexivity, or recursiveness, 
can be mobilized by the therapist because it is in the famlly system. 
Cecchin pointed out that" curiosity" was not a technique or a strat-
egy, but an attitude or a pOSition of the therapist: a stance (Cecchin, 
1987, p. 411). This notion of "stance" signalled a new departure as far 
as the therapist was concerned. Both Hoffman and Real used it to 
convey a less directive and more personal dispOSition of the therapist 
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(Hoffman, 1985; Real, 1990). Now the cybernetic analogy also became 
somewhat strained. There was a move· to introduce a biological one in 
order to capture the self-generating properties of systems (Maturana 
& Verala, 1980), and with an increasing acknowledgement of ideology, 
beliefs (Pearce & Cronen, 1980), and power differentials between men 
and women (Goldner, 1988; Goldner, Penn, Sheinberg, & Walker, 1990; 
McKinnon & Miller, 1987), the discipline settled down to accept sys-
tems as social systems (Andersen, 1991; Anderson, 1997; Bertrando, 
2007; Krause, 2002) eVen if there was no clear agreement about what 
this meant. Anderson and Goolishian considered that systems create 
and reproduce themselves, perhaps around problems in an ecological 
type of way; with adaptation and articulation" of fit held together by 
indirect communication rather than by design., planning, or predict-
ability. The therapist was considered to be a member, along with other 
participants, and participated or facilitated (Real, 1990) rather than 
controlled (Anderson & Goolishian, 1990; Atkinson & Heath, 1990; 
Hoffman, 1985). 1n practice, reflexivity and recursiveness was also 
redefined: 
The new format became known as the reflecting team. We thought of 
the French meaning of the word, not of the English one, which in our 
understanding comes clos~ 70 replication. The French 'reflexion', 
having the same meaning as the Norwegian'reJleksjon', means: some-
thing heard is taken in and thought about before a response is given. 
... Our understanding of the beforehand-infonnation about a system 
would inevitably be within our context. In other words, our own 
context was the background for the information. Therefore, the 
hypotheses were at least to some extent close to where we were. And 
we started to wonder how close we were to those with whom we met. 
[Andersen, 1991, pp. 12-13] 
Here, reflexivity is a process between the therapist and her clients 
with an acknowledgement of the baggage or "prejudices" (Cecchin, 
Lane, & Ray, 1994) that the therapist brings to the therapeutic encoun-
ter. The therapist was in the system, but this did not ensure that she 
could access her client's points of view. The system was now concep-
tualized as a particular aspect of a meaning generating process. 
Anderson and Goolishian explicitly distanced themselves from the 
meaning, which persons acquire as part of their development, learn-
ing, and general participation in social patterns, and instead privi-
" , 
i 
I 
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leged the personal meanings that individuals themselves construct as 
they engage in these social processes (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, 
p. 375). 1n therapy, as inellie; this second aspect of meaning tends to be 
communicated through language, and accordingly systems, including 
those in which therapist and clients take part, were, first and foremost, 
considered to be linguistic systems. Therapy now came to be seen as 
an open conversational domain (Hoffman, 1985), in which therapist 
and clients are constructing meaning through language collabora-
tively. This is social constructionism in systemic psychotherapy. 
Reality and experience are seen to be socially constructed, but the 
focus is on the individual and his or her relationship to the wider 
social context and ideology and not on relationships, defined as two 
or more intimately related persons sharing a history. The focus, thus, 
moves away from privileging one level of a system, for example the 
family; over another (Anderson, 1997, p. 28). The therapeutic conver-
sation could now be redefined, away from the constraint of the family 
as an institution, and therapists became preoccupied with how to 
develop techniques, such as the reflecting team, aimed at promoting 
and generating an atmosphere of equality (Andersen, 1991; Anderson,. 
1997; White, 1997). With echoes of a first-order position, the therapist 
became a different sort of expert, an expert in bringing forth new 
meanings, a master conversationalist (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, 
p. 372). Therapy sessions now emphasized the narratives that indi-
vidual persons and clients tell about themselves and therapists contin-
ued to develop frameworks and models for how to"ask (Epston & 
White, 1992; Freedman & Combs, 1996; Morgan, 2000) in such a way 
that new meanings, narratives, and stories can be generated. Both in 
theory and in practice, this approach emphaSized individuals and 
how individuals with the therapist, sometimes ser;a'lly; co-author and 
co-construct new experiences (Anderson & Goolishian, 1990, 1992; 
Freedman & Combs, 1996; Tomm, 1988). The other aspects of meaning 
generation, referring to those processes whicJ;i implicate continuity; 
development, family relationships, history, patterns, and, as we shall 
see, power, were deliberately put out of view:(Hoffman-Hennessy & 
Davis, 1993). Some systemic thinkers were, however, wondering 
whether the understanding of each by the other was quite so straight-
forward (Fine & Turner, 1991; Go1ann, 1987; Real, 1990). 
It seems; then, that in earlier approaches in systemic psycho-
therapy; persons were considered to exist in the grip of fairly tightly 
-------------------------------------------------------=------------------------------~,~~-"-"-"--------------------------~ 
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connected systems of relationships of which they were not wholly 
aware, while in contemporary social constructionist approaches we 
have swung the other way, to consider individual persons to be rela-
tively unfettered by their relationships and their social contexts and 
language to be a privileged, if not exclusive, vehicle for the expression 
of experience and identity. In either version, the therapist is some kind 
of expert. Either she knows how life should unfold or she knows how 
to ask questions to help life unfold. The move from certainty to 
caution about how things should be has been a welcome aspect of 
social constructionism. However, there has been unease about what 
the reflexive therapist actually should do. Thus, Anderson and GooH-
shians "not-knowing" (1988) and, although from a different position, 
Mason's "safe-uncertainty" (1993) refer to stances with which the ther-
,apist can position herself in order to get" alongside or slightly behind 
the client" (Mason, 1993, p. 195), using markers of uncertainty, such as 
conversational questions, non-intrusive curiosity, and speaking from 
within the cOJwersation (Anderson, 1997). Rober has pointed out that, 
paradOxically, these strategies focus on the receptivity of clients rather 
than on' reflexivity of the therapist. Referring to Bakhtin's (1935) 
notions of "'voice" and /I dialogue", Rober suggested that the therapist 
might use inner conversations between her experiencing self and her 
profeSSional self in order to create a space for her own reflections 
(Rober, 1999). This acknowledges reflection as a more complex process 
for the therapist and, as we shall see below; also provides a position 
from which the approach to the generation of meaning espoused by 
conversationalist therapiSts can be critiqued. 
With emerging postmodern and late capitalist views of individu-
ality, practitioners in all social sciences and psychotherapies have had 
to address reflexivity anew and there has been a tendency to similar 
solutions. Donovan (2009) describes the similarity between Tornm's 
notion of reflexivity and reflective functioning and mentaJization in 
psychoanalysis (Fonagy & Target, 2003), and states that both aim to 
help clients develop a capacity to interpret the feelings, thoughts, 
actions, etc., of other persons. Donovan does not mention how mental-
ization engages therapiSts, but notes that it is doubtful that mentaliz-
ation can be described as psychoanalysis (p. 159). Social anthropolo-
gists have turned to psychotherapy for a promise of solutions to the 
difficult methodological problems presented both by theory (Moore, 
2007) and participant observation (Mimica, 2007).' Here, for some of 
-, 
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the most well-known anthropologists, self-reflexivity has shifted the 
emphaSiS from the anthropolOgist as ethnographer to the anthropolo-
gist as author (Gifford & Marcus, 1986; Geertz, 1988), while others 
have sought to be explicit about the way their scholarly work 
expresses their own: political orientations (Graeber, 2007; Rabinow & 
Marcus, 2008). 
It is clear that using our own selves to learn about others and the 
world presents difficult and thorny problems. How might we then set 
about developing a comprehensive reflexivity? That is to say; reflexivity 
which encompasses re=siveness between the different aspects of 
meaning, interpretation, and experience held or expressed by persons 
(either clients or therapiSts) as well as the self-reflexivity of both the 
therapist and clients vis-a-vis their own history; development, and 
background and the contexts in which they participate. Can we open 
up meanings and possibilities for clients, that is to say; produce new 
knOWledge and broaden the enquiry to include the social production 
of therapy knowledge and techniques and of the power embedded in 
these? Can systemic psychotherapists both participate and observe?2 
Bourdieu has suggested the concept of "participant objectivation" for 
social anthropologists, He wrote, 
What needs to be objectivised ... is not the social anthropologist 
performing the anthropological analysiS of a foreign world, but the 
social world that has made both the anthropologist and the conscious 
and unconscious anthropology that she (or he) engages in her anthro-
pological practice-not only her social origins, her pOSition, her trajec-
tory in social space, her social and religious membership and beliefs" 
gender, age, nationality, etc., but also, and most importantly, her 
particular position within the microcosm of anthropologiSts. [Bour-
dieu, 2003, p, 283J 
We might not go along with Bourdieu in dismissing what the ther-
apist does in the therapy room, but we can incorporate his idea of 
"classifying the classiflers", or "observing the observers observing" 
(Rabinow, 2008, p. 57) into our thinking and practice. Indeed, some 
systemic thinkers have made suggestions along these lines. Thus, 
White's idea of "takingit back" advocates that the therapist reflects on 
her own position to the client (White, 1997), which might or might not 
include a recognition of the institutional and historical ernbeddedness 
other and her work. Rober and Seltzer (2010) consider how details of 
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therapeutic practices of which the therapist is unaware could colonize 
clients and handicap their self-determination. Burnham (2005) des-
cribes asking questions about questions about the therapeutic rela-
tionship, and Guilfoyle (2003) points out that conversational or 
dialogical therapies both reflect and conceal power, because, follow-
ing Foucault, power is already there in the social., cultural, and insti-
tutional context outside the therapy room and, therefore, firmly 
embedded in the lives of the people in it. I think that we can discern 
that we are beginning to come full circle. By interrogating what the 
therapist actually does in the therapy room, how she thinks and what 
she says, we begin to be drawn to her context,.. development,. and 
history, and in this way to glimpse earlier systemic preoccupations 
with patterns and continuity. We can find a similar tendency in how 
systemic psychotherapists have thought about "the subject", "the 
person", andNthe individual", to which I now turn. 
The subject in systemic psychotherapy 
Take a look through the index of prominent texts in systemic psycho-
therapy and you will find.virtually no referen.:es to "individual", 
"person", or "subject". This probably reflects the reaction to psycho-
analysis at the beginning of the life of the discipline and, indeed, where 
we do find systemic psychotherapists referring to "subjects", they also 
tend to be those writers who are interested in psychoanalytic ideas 
(Flaskas, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2005, 2009; Frosh, 2009; Lamer, 2000; Pocock, 
1997, 2005, 2006, 2009). As systemic psychotherapists, we have no 
explicit theory of subjectivity and we do not say what we think consti-
tu~s U a person" / /I an :individual" I or /I a subject". Are the clients and 
families we see similar to or different from ourselves? In what way? To 
what extent? Unless of explicit interest, few systemic psychotherapists, 
including most of those referred to in this chapter, mention the cultural 
background, race, or ethn!city of either themselves or the clients they 
describe.' Our ideas about social construction relate to what goes on 
between family members and clients or between ourselves and clients, 
and not to the extent to which personhood, individuality, and subjec-
tivity itself might be socially or cultUrally constructed. 
It has not helped that we have not been interested in the limits of 
these processes of social construction. Our attention has been on 
, 
j. 
, 
, I 
, 
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diversity and difference, and yet our understanding of differences and 
diversity implies that something must be universal, but we do not say 
what we think this might be (Krause, 2009). I suggest that terms such 
as "the individual" and "the person" have articulated this universal-
ity obliquely in such a way that it has become an assumption, which 
we do not interrogate. Perhaps we assume that "individual" and 
IIperson" are empty or abstract entities, which only come to life in 
relationships? Or do we asSume that all individuals and persons are 
more or less like us and live in families like ours, that is to say, in late 
capitalist families with Eura-American ideas of family life and kinship 
relations? Some of us (including myself) have ideas about our own 
• families in which kinship tends to be seen " ... to be concerned with 
what people do [did] everywhere with the facts of nature" (Strathern, 
1992, p. 46). So, the symbols we use in genograms derive from genet-
ics and we start with an egocentric view; following lateral relation-
ships, excluding collateral ones, and tracing relationships bilaterally 
(Krause, 1998). Our assumptions about what constitutes individuals, 
persons, and subjects have, thus ... functioned as constraints on diver-
sity in two ways. First, because this domain was not theorized, but 
assum.ed to be more or less homogeneous, and second, because the 
cultural mode! on which it was based was seen to be nature itself. In 
this, we exdude other points or view, sum as those in which the 
maternal or paternal relations might be considered more important for 
identity and personhood or those in which kinship relationships come 
before rather than after individuality (Strathern, 1988). And yet this 
dominant view is being challenged in several ways by the demands of 
clinical practice in our own contemporary societies. Thus, cross-
cultural psychotherapy; gay and lesbian relationships, the reconstitu-
tion of families, fostering and adoption, and the increasing incidence 
of NF and surrogacy all challenge orthodox assumptions about relat-
edness and about the generation and constitution of personhood and 
individuality (Carstens, 2004) . 
This notion of lithe individual" and lithe person" was carried into 
second order approaches in the form of an overtly stated discontinu-
ity between political, cultural, and social processes on the one hand, 
and what Anderson and Goolishian called active communication, on 
the other (Anderson & Goolishian, 1986, p. 6). They saw meaning as 
being generated in language through conversations intersubjec!ively 
constructed, placing emphasis on the agreement between persons 
~~~~~~-,~~~~~~~~~, 
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about understanding that they are experiencing the same event in the 
same way (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, p. 372). As we have seen 
earlier, in this view, social and cultural ideologies have little hold on 
individuals, who together are seen to create shared meanings by talk-
ing to each other, by having a dialogue. "Social organisation is the 
product of social communication, rather than social communication 
being a product of social organisation" (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, 
p. 278). Thus, the emphasis on language becomes intelligible. But 
which language? Why did the existence of different languages and the 
different cultural meanings and traditions they reflect not pose both a 
theoretical and a clinical problem for this model of human relation-
ships? Of course, the learning and use of language is.a human capa-
. bility, but, as we all know in practice, this does not mean that 
communicating in and across different languages is straightforward. 
By focusing on language as a formal phenomenon, this line of think-
ing trivializes differences in specific and local experiences and under-
standings (Burck, 2005) and is in danger of obscuring potential conflict 
between therapists and clients. No wonder that the generation of 
equality in the therapy room was seen to be more or less straightfor-
wardly achievable through technique. 
Anderson and Goolishian (1988) wrote that "meaning and under-
stending do not exist prior to the utterances in language" (p. 378), but 
the emphasis on linguistic aspects of semiotics is a problem. Semiotics 
is the study of meaning as signs and symbols and is closely implicated 
in what we generally understend to be culture. However, not all indi-
viduals who consider themselves to belong to the same culture share 
all meanings, and individuals also participate in cultural meanings of 
('""which they are not aware (Krause, 2002). Thus, meaning is not coter-
'\ rrrinous with language and, indeed, might not be expressed -ade-
, quately in words. The idea that meaning is developed and generated 
L through representations in conversation or dialogue in the therapy 
rooms is, therefore, only one half of the story. The other half is that 
meaning is generated in the relationship between those representa-
tions arid knowledge that already exists (Milton, 2002). Persons have 
knowledge about the world, which they have acquired through past 
relationships with others who have occupied particular positions and 
had particular relationships to them, and this knowledge is modified, 
influenced, and changed according to a person's own interactions and 
communications with others and their experiences as their lives 
'I-
, 
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unfold. The di;uogue and the conversation in the therapy room is a 
process which creates new meanings, but there is much knowledge 
before and behind these new meanings (Malik & Krause, 2005) and 
therapists and clients themselves might have much less access to this 
and be less aware of it. To be sure, persons and individuals are 
subjects of their actions, their communications, and their words, but 
there are other aspects to subjectivity, many of them more obscure. 
This is why conversatiol)S, narratives, and dialogues, and particu-
larly cross-cultural ones, are so much more problematic than is often 
made out. It is one thing to acknowledge one's own position as a 
white, middle-class therapist, but quite another to become aware of 
the extent to which one's own ideas, attitudes, and knowledge about 
the world, about relationships, about bodies, about personhood and 
subjectivity are culturally constructed. These aspects of experience 
and meaning might facilitate or constrain and they might not be visi-
ble or available to be voiced. This presents a dilemma for interpreta-
tion and understanding. The psychotherapist, like the ethnographer, 
is a little like Hermes, the messenger for the Greek gods. In her inter-
pretations, she must communicate the very foreignness that her 
interpretations deny in their claim to universality (Crapanzano, 1992, 
p. 44). This dilemma cannot be solved, and we might say that the 
process of therapy is to be found in the very dynamiC of it.4 
To an extent, this dilemma is captured in what is referred to 
currently as dialogical approaches in systemic psychotherapy. Indeed, 
dialOgical approaches could be considered a contemporary attempt to 
develop and incorporate a theory of "the subject" in the discipline. 
The inspiration derives from Bakhtin's idea of the dialogical self 
(Bakhtin, 1935). I shall give a brief summa:r:Y, and I refer readers to 
Holquist (1990) and Hermans and Kempen (1993), as well as to the 
authors discussed below. In brief, the dialogical self can be described 
as a multiplicity of "I" -positions in the mind of a person intertwined 
with the minds of other people. The 'T' is always open and unformed, 
as opposed to another part of the self, which is finalized in language. 
We represent ourselves to ourselves as well as to others in this final-
ized, more categOrical way in the form of words. The dialogical self 
refers to this dialogical process in the meaning that we make of 
ourselves, and Bakhtin calls this "the authoring of the self" (Holquist, 
1990, p. 84). Existence is experienced as a mass of stimuli from the 
nattIral environment, individual organisms, and other persons. This is 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~"---"~~~ 
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#heteroglossia", from which meaning in the world is authored. But the 
'1:" is not a free agent. Rather, the ''I'' puts words to the world, draw-
ing upon the languages, the dialects, and the words of others, to which 
a person has been exposed. Understanding, then, is a creative dialog-
. ical process in which meanings of different parties come into contact 
and new meanings are created. The self is, thus," a relational phenom-
enon, which transcends the boundaries between inside and outside, 
between the self and others. 
It is not difficult to see the attraction of these ideas to systemic 
psychotherapists. The relational domain, which we have been so used 
to locate betvveen individual persons, can now be seen to be internal 
to them in the processes of identity formation. The model also allows 
us to understand personhoo<L identity, and selfhood as changing and 
contested according to individual circumstances, rather than as so 
many identical copies. As therapists, we must welcome this, while at 
the same time not ignore the myriad cultural meanings that enter the 
events, languages, and' utterances in local lives. For example, we have 
to accommodate the experiences of persons such as one of my clients)" 
who chooses to remain a single mother despite the protestations of her 
Bangladeshi farrrily. and, at the same time, insists on taking preventa-
tive actions to{Oounter bla<:\<. magic We also have to acknowledge that 
we {oanIlot predict, or somel:iines even identify, the mmbinations of 
events and meanings in the lives of our clients. The model of the 
dialogical self allows for this complexity; but this has not been 
acknowledged by all its advocates. 
Although the question of whether therapy constitutes a special 
kind of conversation is a legitimate one (Bertrando, 2007; Guilfoyle, 
. 2002), here. I am interested in the way different systemic psycho-
therapists have used Bakhtin's ideas and the implications for assump-
tions about "the person" or "the subject". Seikkula, Arnkil, and 
Eriksson suggest that dialogism is less a theory about human beings 
everywhere than a "professional expertise called for by post-modem 
development" (2003, p. 186). In this, they seem to suggest that open 
dialogue is a technique, which aims to encourage individual subjectiv-
ity; encourage reciprocal dialogue, create polyphony; and tolerate 
uncertainty. This is based on the idea that "in every social situation the 
reality is constructed entirely in the specific {Oonnection taking place in 
this particular situation" (Seikkula, 2003, p. 84). I think that there are 
problems with this interpretation. If open dialogue is a technique, then 
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perhaps, as.Bertrando has pointed out (2007, pp. 152-153), the thera-
peutic clialogue is not a real dialogue after all. With the focus on the 
social construction of reality in the therapeutic conversation, Seikkula 
and his colleagues ignore Bakhtin's other process of self-authoring: 
that which draws upon the events to which a person has been exposed 
throughout her life, or what Holland and Lave (2001, pp. 3-33) have 
referred to as "history in person". This refers to bundles of discourses, 
some from the past, some from the present some in fantasy;. some 
from rituals and myths, and some from dreams. These processes are 
"languages of heteroglossia", from which we make choices in the 
authoring of ourselves, but we might not always be conscious that this 
is what we are doing. By referring to dialogue as a technique rather 
than as a theory of subjectivity; Seikkula and other advocates of 
dialogical therapies obscure the full extent of the authoring of their 
selves from themselves. In doing so, they produce an imbalance in 
which they implicitly make use of the full complex;ty of their own 
subjectivity (because how could they do otherwise?), while simplify-
ing these processes for their clients. 
I agree with Bertrando that Bakhtin's ideas require more robust-
ness from the therapist, because only in this way can dialogical under-
standing unfold. Thus, Bertrando argues that, as a therapist, he must 
express an opinio", because it is only w'hen his ideas are put into play 
with the ideas of his clients that true dialogue can take place (Ber-
trando, 2007, p. 153). With the therapist expressing opinions, the ther-
apeutic dialogue is closer to all dialogues and the theory of the subject 
applied to all parties. This is a less colonizing starting point for the 
therapiSt. However, Bertrando also tells a story of a sexologist thera-
pist and his work with a woman client, who, in her sessions, told her 
story; while the therapist listened. One day, this client surprised the 
therapist by suing him for trying to seduce her. Bertrando explains 
that in this case the dialogue between the therapist and the client was 
not a true dialogue. "To him they were sharing a-narrative, to her, they 
were distant and he was threatening" (p. 152). I can think of many 
cross-cultural and cross-race scenarios in therapy; particularly involv-
ing gender, where the dialogue has unfolded or has been in danger of 
unfolding in just this way. Dialogue in therapy is not free of conflict, 
particularly not when the social context is laden with it in the form of 
racism, sexism, class differences, and other types of discrimination. 
This is acknowledged by Rober, who emphasizes the polyphony of 
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voices in which persons might speak (2005), and in particular the 
potential of our own voices, empowered by our own dominant 
culture, to colonize (Rober & Seltzer, 2010). How could power, author-
ity, and conflict be eradicated from the therapy room, when these 
processes exist in the wider social institutions that provide the context 
for therapy? 
In anthropology; Bakhtin's ideas have been attractive precisely 
because they have offered a theory of the "subject" which acknowl-
edges the social aspects of expression and social life and an alternative 
to a psychoanalytic framework. As we have seen in systemic psycho-
therapy, the "behavioural subject" was replaced by "the cognitive 
subject" and, although a promising framework, if considered in its 
totality, approaches inspired by Bakhtin remain within a cognitive 
theory of subjectivity. However, neither the "behavioural subject" nor 
"the cognitive subject" captures comprehensively what it is like to be 
a person. In particular, they leave out emotions and feelings. This is 
not to say that emotions and feelings have been ignored In practice. It 
is difficult to conceive of any therapy without emotions, and emo-
tional bondedness has been assumed to be the basis for all relation-
ships (Bowen, 1978) and the foundation for all human systems (Ber-
trando, 2007). Emotions have also recently been the subject of several 
publications (Bertrando, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2010; Bertrando & Arcelloni, 
2009; Fredman, 2004; Krause, 1993, 2007, 2009, 2010a,b; Pocock, 2009, 
201Oa,b). It was, in fact, the emotional outlook of the Iatrnul men and 
women, and the inversion of this in the naven ritual, which first alerted 
Bateson to the, dynamic of these relationships and to schismogenesis. 
The naven ritual was a ritual of initiation for a young man, mark-
ing his entry into adulthood. In everyday life, Iatrnul women were 
expected to be co-operative and self-effacing. whereas men were 
expected to be fiercely competitive and flamboyant. In naven, this was 
reversed, so that men who were mother's brothers to the young man 
dressed in dirty women's clothes, smeared themselves with ashes, and 
carried symbols of femininity and motherhood, while women strutted 
around dressed like men with feathers, headdresses, and ornaments 
made from the bones and teeth of enemies killed in warfare. The 
whole thing was embarraSSing for the young man, but it also took 
place with much hilarity and mockery. By prOviding opportunities for 
both men and women to experience emotions that were not normally 
an aspect of their own gendered social personhood, the naven ritual, 
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Bateson argued, contributed to psychological integration. But emo-
tions also expressed' two other aspects. One was a convergence of sub-
jective and cultural Dutlooks. Bateson argued that it is not possible to 
interpret a particular emotion expressed by an individual without first 
knowirtg something about the general emotional outlook of a culture, 
a system, or a relationship (1958). The other referred to a more general 
capacity of humans to experience and express emotions. Bateson 
described how it was not until he realized and experienced the fun 
and hilarity in the naven ritual himself that he could get an idea about 
what the ritual was about (Bateson, 1958, p. 259). So, while emotions 
articulate subjective and cultural experiences and outlooks, they 
might also provide an anchor for cross-cultural experience even if this 
by itself is not enough for understanding. In this sense, as I have 
argued elsewhere, emotions might call the context and this context, as 
well as referring to past experiences of clients and therapist; is also a 
place (the therapy room at a specific time) where our education about 
our clients begins (Crapanzano, 1992; Krause, 2010b). Such a frame-
work opens up a consideration of processes which are less accessible, 
perhaps outside awareness and unconscious, such as, for example, 
fantasies (Pocock, 2010b), dreams (Luepnitz, 2009) and embodiment 
(Csordas, 2002; Malik & Krause, 2005; Wilson, 2007). 
Emphasizing relationships has meant that it never was straight-
forward to develop a theory of the "the subject" or "the person" in 
systemic psychotherapy. AS an assumption, the "behavioural subjecf' 
emerged alongside the cybernetic metaphor for relationships. But this 
itself was a development from an earlier structural functionalist 
notion of social systems as organisms, in which different aspects of the 
system were seen to be tightly interrelated. Bateson's brilliance con-
sisted in'realizing early in the history of anthropology that such a view 
of a social system must be accompanied by the meaning attributed to 
the different social, COgnitive, and emotional processes by persons 
who are engaged in them. But, with an emphasis on cybernetics, the 
role of culture in systems and relationships waS lost (Harries-Jones, 
1995) and emotions and feelings tended to be conceptualized as being 
generated inside individual bodies (Krause, 2007). 
With the linguistic turn, the individual person's or client's rela-
tionship to the wider social context came into view, but the full range 
of possibilities of variations in language/meaning could not be 
accessed because language and cognition defined the system rather 
.~,~~~-~.----~ ---~ 
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than being an aspect of it. The" cognitive self" entailed a formal view 
of language and linguistics and meant that different languages and 
different, sometimes unconscious, meanings were not within view. 
Within this framework, it has been difficult to develop a nuanced 
theory of the subject and to link individuals to social systems or to 
systems of relationships in anything but a simplistic manner. In turn, 
the role of individuals and persons have been conceptualized in terms 
of biological or social redUctionism, neither of which can do justice to 
the complexity of diversity. Bakhtin's ideas about the "dialogical self" 
have helped to straddle exiernal and internal worlds and provided a 
possibility for developing a space in the diScipline with room for the 
unfolding of the dynamic of the behavioural, cognitive, emotional, 
social, co-temporal, and historical processes in real life. I now consider 
what this implies for how we think about culture. 
--. 
Culture 
Those therapists who have continued to emphasize patterns, past and 
present contexts, history, often colonial history, and systems have also 
been those who have addres~ed issues of culture and race as central 
issues in their writings and many of them are from minority back-
grounds themselves (Boyd-Franklin, 1989, DiNicola, 1997; Falicov, 
1988, 1995, 1998a,b, 2005; Fiscl<, 1991; Hardy & Laszloffy; 1995, 1998; 
Krause, 2002; McGoldrick, 1998; Watts-Jones, 1997, 2002). Early on, 
some of these approaches iterated the strong grip that systems were 
seen to have on individual persons and, therefore, tended to promote 
essentialized notions of culture, race, and ethnicity (McGoldrick, 
Pearce, & Giordano, 1982). However, later approaches have paid 
attention to cultural and ethnic dimensions while at the same time 
exploring the kinds of structures that might help us to think about 
these. Thus, Falicov has advocated thinking about cultural context, 
migration-culturation, family life cycles, and family organization in 
order to provide a focus for a comparison and an exploration of the 
similarities and differences between therapists and their clients 
(Falicov, 1995, 1998b, 2005), lloyd-Franklin focused on the empower-
ment of black families and emphasized the need for therapists to 
draw on different systemic models. The inter-institutional perspec-
tive (Montalvo & Gutierrez, 1988), the ecolOgical systems approach 
i 
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(Auerswald, 1968), and the eco-systemic approach (Falicov, 1998a) are 
further examples of approaches that have highlighted the connections 
between social ideology and institutions and individual and family 
experiences. Why does attention to race, culture, and ethnicity make 
it more likely fhat both individual dimensions and social dimensions 
of meaning and exPerience are kept in view? I have argued elsewhere 
that this is because culture has system -like properties, fhat is to say; 
over time there is some continuity in cultural patterns. This is not total 
and predictable, but it is enough for persons to have expectations as 
if such continuity exists (Hastrup, 2007; Krause, 2002, p. 24). This does 
not mean that persons cannot construct something new, only that 
whatever is new is always brought forth against the background of 
something that was there before. A similar continuity; but more fixed,. 
exists in racial and ethnic categories. These categories reflect the 
construction, negotiation, and maintenance of social and political 
boundaries as expressed in individual identities (Jenkins, 1997), and 
they; too, articulate patterns and have a history, and often a colonizing 
one, even if this might not be reflected in the conscious experience of 
the majority of professionals. 
Accepting this also means accepting that the complexity is not 
always within the awareness of persons, either therapiSts or clients. 
Thus, persons are not fully aware of Bakhtin's heteroglossia and inter-
nal dialogues are not necessarily explicit in conversation, but depend 
on the position and receptivity of the interlocutor. Despite the chal-
lenges posed by communicating across different languages, language 
can be made accessible. We can identify a glossary, a dictionary, or a 
native speaker, and, in this way; make progress towards finding trans-
lations, either with interpreters or by our own trial and error. Or we 
can rely on signs and physical connections. Other, more implicit, 
aspects of the conversationl such as past experienq!s of discrimination 
or assumptions about what kind of reciprocity or what kind of connec-
tions make a relationship, might be more tricky. Thus, we might not 
be aware ourselves that our notions of kinship and family are built 
upon particular assumptions about the way nature and culture inter-
sect, Or that persons from other cultural traditions might build rela-
tionships on different premises (Carstens, 2004; Strathern, 1992, 1999). 
We have begun to take some of this to heart, such as in a recognition 
of the different emphaSiS between sociocentric and egocentric out-
looks in kinship relationships (Fisek, 1991; Krause, 1998; Malik & 
I 
20 CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Mandin, this volume; Singh & Clarke, 2006; Tamura & Lau, 1992), but 
other aspects of persons, such as the body, the self, perception, emo-
tion, and the notion of a relationship in itself might also articulate 
different orientations. Strathern comments, on the limits of Euro-
American perspectives, 
what might interpretation look like in a society that does not, as here, 
imagine perspectives as self-referential, 'unique' contexts for action 
and hence with the potential to coexist with, and overlap with, limit-
less numbers of 'unique' others? ... One must Simply be prepared for 
the unpredictable, including different distributions of what people 
take as finite and what they take as infinite about their circumstances. 
[Strathem, 1999, p. 249] 
Of course, one perspective can provide a perspective on another 
perspective.' The client's perspective can provide a perspective on the 
therapist's perspective. But this does not necessarily yield a reciprocal 
or a mutually defined relation or understanding. Neither may be 
defined in the terms of which the other is not. On the contrary, each 
perspective might be connected to a unique range of phenomena and 
refer to quite different contexts for action. Inger and Inger (1994) 
suggest that ethics is the ability of holding two or more points of view 
Simultaneously. I prefer to say that the process in ethical practice, 
reflexivity, is assessing your own perspective while, at the same time, 
developing the perspective which the other comes to have of your 
perspective against the background of their own perspective. This 
means that we are always representing our relations to others and we 
cannot do so independently of perspective (for perspective, read 
assumptions, history, theory, or epistemology). 
We may take "othering" to exemplify one such perspective in 
current social science and psychotherapy (Benjamin, 1998; Clifford & 
Marcus, 1986; Das, 2007; Dalal, 2002; Fanon, 1952; Kitzinger & Wilkin-
son, 1996; Klein, 1946; Said, 1978; Segal, 1994; Wmnicott, 1971). This is 
a complex area, and here I wish to provide a very summary statement 
of two main positions, as I see. these. One is the psychoanalytic view. 
In this, subjectivity develops as a result of the introduction of a third 
party to the dyadic relationship between infant and primary carer. 
This triangle helps the infant tolerate frustration and discomfort. If the 
blissful, idealized state of one-ness is unmediated, this generates 
I' 
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states of mind in the baby in which the baby feels attacked, as in an 
earlier stage of development, and reacts without being able to think 
and reflect (Klein, 1946). Because these states and functions are the 
primitive building blocks of persons in relationships throughout our 
lives, they are also considered to be states of mind into which mature 
personS might fall again and again. Wmnicott (1971) suggested that 
these proeesses involve transitional phenomena in the form of sym-
bols and play in such a way that when a baby develops the capacity 
to use a symbol of union (and this depends on the building of trust 
between baby and care-taker), he or she comes to benefit develop-
mentally from separation. This is where Wmnicott locates cultural 
experience: 
I have used the term ;; cultural experience" as an extension of the idea 
of transitional phenomena and of play without being certain that I can 
define the word if culture". The accent indeed is on experience. In 
usiog the word" culture" I am thiokiog of the inherited tradition. I am 
thiokiog of something that is io the common pool of humanity, into 
which individuals and groups of people may contribute, and from 
which we may all draw if we have somewhere to put what we find. 
[>yinnicott, 2006[1971], p. 133, original italics] 
and 
The ioterplay between originality and the acceptance of tradition as a 
basis for inventiveness seems to me to be just one more example, arid 
a very exciting one, of the interplay between separateness and union. 
[Wionicott, 2006[1971], p. 134] 
I think that Wmnicott's thoughts on "the location of cultural exp'" 
rience" help us to understand something fundamental about cultural 
processes, which is that these are processes that are experienced 
emotionally; on the body and in the mind, from the very beginning of 
life. However, even though as W:mni~ott's ideas suggest, lithe otherl is 
outside, possibly bent on omnipotence and destructiveness, just as we 
ourselves might be, we cannot Simply scale up this view to encompass 
and account for whole societies and their alliances and conflicts. 
Benjamin has pointed to the correspondence between the psycho-
analytical problem of overcoming omnipotence and the political prob-
lem of non-violence, 
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The question-Can a subject relate to the other without assimilating 
the other to the self through identification?-corresponds to the 
political question, Can a community admit the Other without her /him 
having to already be or become the same? [Benjamin, 1998, p. 94] 
While this correspondence is clear, it does not attend to the myriad 
different ways, inside and outside of awareness, alterity might be 
experienced and (mis )uriderstood in the communication between 
persons of different cultural and racial backgrounds in actual commu-
nities and social contexts. 
For this, we have to turn to the second position, that of social 
science. In this, our epistemologies and our descriptions of other soci-
eties and cultures reflect particular dominant economic, political" 
historical, and colonizing interests in our own societies (Khanna, 2003; 
Said, 1978). These are also reflected in the terms employed by states 
and bureaucracies to categorize populations and to bestow rights and 
duties, privileges and penalties, and in the rhetoric through which this 
is communicated. They are also tacit in the expression and experience 
of identities and relationships (Baldacchino, 2011; Gifford & Marcus, 
1986; Collini, 2010; Ewing 1997, 2008; Foucault, 1978; Hall, 1996; 
ZiZek,1989). While, in gener.,I, the constraints and influences of these 
social processes upon persons and populations take place in any soci-
ety or social organization,the categories in which they find expression 
are cultural ones, that is to say- they are imbued with specific mean-
ing, conscious and unconscious, and contextually and historically 
constructed. In one way or another, these meanings, in tum, enter the 
processes of unity and separateness in the dynamiC between carers 
and children referred to by Wmnicott. 
As I see this, these two views underpin each other. In everyday 
practice in systemic psychotherapy- differences, and especially those 
which are conceptualized in terms of race, culture, and ethnicitY-
evoke primitive states and "othering" processes in therapists no less 
than in other persons. I think that this explains the persistent practice 
in systemic psychotherapy of not mentioning cultural, racial, or ethnic 
background or context in clinical discussions or in case examples and 
scenarios in written papers about generic theoretical issues, such as 
reflexivity. I also think that this explains the difficulties and imbal-
ances in applying dialogical theories comprehenSively. In Bhaktin's 
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notion of the dialogical self, a person is both subject and object to 
herself. However, in the actual lives of persons, subject and object 
easily slide into a distinction between the self and other and between 
a complex and·reified view of subjectivity. Intuitively, we know that, 
despite OUI embodied selves, we are not objects, but when it comes to 
other bodies and persons and, in particular, other bodies that are very 
different from ourselves, 'we run the risk of objectifying them. Power, 
stereotyping,-discrimination, and racism are processes of objectifica-
tion in which one party relates to the other as subject to object and 
mutuality in perspectives has been lost. . 
Concluding thoughts 
Is relating to others in this way inevitable? I do not think so, at least 
not for all of the time. In this chapter, we have seen that even with the 
development of social constructionism and second order approaches, 
which have encouraged therapists to take more responsibility for their 
practice, systemic psychotherapy has continued to promote certain 
blind spots. The most glaring of these have been the failure to think 
about or define uthe subject", lithe person", or even .I.lthe individual". 
Because we have not paid attention to our own assumptions about 
what constitutes a person and what it is about subjectivity or person-
hood that we assume to be universally applicable, we have also 
remained unclear about what it is that makes possible what we do 
btow about ourselves and our clients. nus lack has come under pres-
sure from the increasing interest in the discipline in "reflection" and 
"reflexivity" and in Hcu1ture" and IIpower/race/, but it seems to have 
taken a long time for the discipline to be able to connect these areas 6£ 
theory and practice within a systemic framework of theoretical prac-
tice, and there is still a tendency to ascribe more complexity to 
ourselves than to our clients. In this chapter, I have argued that we 
need to move away from implicitly promoting a view of subjectivity 
as either "'emptyN or "just like us", or as repeatedly socially con-
structed and reconstructed in interaction with us: I have suggested 
that the emphasis on language and texts has not been helpful, not only 
because the privileging of language itself is a cultural assumption, 
but also because this emphasiS has tended to exclude embodied, 
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emotionaL and experiential dimensions of "the subject" and "the self'. 
These dimensions implicate cultural meaning, expectations, and his-
tory, and an emphasis on culb.lre, race, and power, therefore, raises 
questions about continuity as well as patterns of meaning which 
may be histOrically and socially implicit and outside consciousness 
altogether. I believe that, while this all complicates the picture for us 
as psychotherapists, this complexity also offers us an opportunity to 
take proper account of it and, in doing so, to move forward. I also 
believe that here systemic psychotherapy might have a contribution to 
make to psychotherapy and mental health practice generally in the 
twenty-first century. So, how do we begin to develop a comprehensive 
reflexivity, that is to say; a reflexivity which acknowledges recursive-
ness between different aspects of meaning, interpretation, and experi-
ence, as well as a self-reflexivity vis-a.-vis our own history,. develop-
ment, and background? Perhaps we might reframe our stance in the 
follOwing way. 
Mattingly comments that <;ross-cultural or cross-race narratives are 
remarkable, not so much fOl: what they convey as for what they leave 
out (Mattingly; 2008). She refers to such discourses as "the border 
zone" (p. 139), because, although in cross-cultural systemic psycho-
therapy therapists and clients ,cannot be said to belong to a Single 
. shared culture even when they have been members of the same soci-
ety for a long time, it is also misleading to consider that they operate 
in discontinuous worlds. In the therapy room therapist and clients are 
exemplifying moments of cultural differentiation (Bhabha, 1994), 
while, at the same time, they must have been brought together there 
by some coterminous process. This idea of "borders" has been des-
cribed and debated by many others, including systemic psycho-
therapists interested in these issues (Daniel, this volume; DiNicola, 
1997; Falicov, 1995, 2009; Henderso:n, 1995; Turner, 1969; Werbner & 
Modood, 1997), but I want to highlight the reference to time and 
context in the idea. To me, ''border zone" refers tb a contemporary site 
where the therapist and clients come together. This site is character-
ized by being in a specific context and historical time with a specific 
task (the clinical encounter). "The contemporary" refers to what goes 
on in this Site, in the moment of the session, in the dialogue, and 
in the interactions, in the present. However, the reference to time 
also reminds us that in this domain old and new elements coexist in 
1 
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multiple configurations and variation and that we cannot assume that 
what is new, what happens in the present., in the conversation or in 
the dialogue between the therapist and the clients, a'lways is dominant 
and that what is old is always residual (RabinoW; 2008, p. 2). The idea 
of the contemporary alerts us to the need to acknowledge that what 
happens in the conversation in the therapy office always incorporates 
and is set against the background of the past, as well as the pOSSibili-
ties for the future (see also Boscolo & Bertando, 1992, for an early 
expression of this). We need to bear this in mind with all the force of 
comprehensive reflexivity we can muster. Bateson's idea of pre;ru,.e 
(see also Bertrando, 2007, and this volume) might assist us here. 
Bateson defined a premise as "a generalised statement of a particular 
assumption or implication reCOgnisable in a number of details of 
cultural behaviour" (Bateson, 1958, p. 24). Batson's idea was shaped 
by dominant ideas in anthropology at the time, which undoubtedly 
underemphasized change and individual agency. Placing premise in 
our current context, we might say that a premise is a perspective. It is 
like a thread of coherence running through meaning, representations,. 
and expectations, but that may be experienced only in a fragmentary 
shifting form by individual subjects. The Euro-American emphasis on 
unique self-referential subjects noted by 5trathern, above, is an exam-
ple of a perspective.' A perspective is, thus, a result of cultural, social, 
historical, and relational contexts and individual persons' experiences 
of these, and refers to the relationship between the past, the present, 
and the expectations for the future from a particular point of view. A 
perspective is what persons (therapists and clients) consciously or 
unconsciously bring to the contemporary site of psychotherapy. 
"Perspective" and "the contemporary" alerts us to the temporality in 
"voice" and "dialogue" as well as to the existence of some kind of 
pattern in the lives of ourselves and our clients. At the same time, they 
also ought to alert us to how uncertain and dOwnright wrong we 
might be in guessing about them .. 
With the therapist moving inside the system in systemic psycho-
therapy and with an accompanying emphasis on formal language 
and on the present in the form of conversation and dialogue in the 
therapy room, both the present and the future have come to be seen 
as relatively unfettered by the past. Pattern, context, and system 
have been replaced by co-construction, text, and narrative. This has 
~~~~~~-~-
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obscured both the continuity and containment; which culture affoIds 
to individual persons and, somewhat paradoxically, the social and 
political conflict, which exists in wider contemporary social processes 
and institutions and has, in this way; contributed to collective pro-
cesses of othering and objectification in the discipline. Viewing reflex-
ivity through culture alerts us to the similarity between ourselves and 
our clients, in so far as it points us to a complex mixture of fragmented 
conscious and unconscious cultural and political processes which 
constitute the conditions for our existence and our relationships. The 
possibility of our communication within and across cultures, races, 
ethnicities, and power positions is based on all of us sharing these 
conditions for existence. At the same time, constructive communica-
tion is only a possibility if we are able to acknowledge perspectives 
other than our own in both theory and practice. For this we must 
develop an understanding of history; memory; pattern, and continuity 
as well as o~ the beliefs, motivations,· wishes, aims, and intentions of 
our clients and ourselves, and it is this that is called forth in the 
contemporary context of systemic psychotherapy. 
Notes 
1. We may descnoe the first as a modernist approach and the second as a 
postmodem one. 
2. This methodological debate is ongoing in anthropology, with many 
different positions. Probably the position taken by most anthropologists 
is a pragmatic one rooted in critical realism (Borneman & HammoudiI 
2009; Davies, 1999; Graeber, 2007). 
3. When the race or ethnicity of clients are included as clinical material, this 
also commonly tends to be problematized and racialized. 
4. Anderson also refers to Hermes, Zeus' 5 messenger, and his tasks 
(Anderson, 1997). However, she does not emphasize the dilemma in all 
translation, which Benjamin has characterized thus: HAll translation ... is 
only a somewhat provisional w~y of coming to terms with the foreign-
ness of languages" (Benjamin, 1998, quoted in Crapanzano, 1992, p. 43). 
5. Positioning may be seen as an aspect of perspectivism. See Campbell and 
qT0enbaek (2006), and Campbell (this volume). 
6. Andersen (1991) and Taylor (1985a,b) both refer to the idea of premise 
using the terms #pre-Wlderstanding" and "background un4erstanding"! 
respectively. 
CULTURE AND THE REFLEXIVE SUBJECT IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 27 
References 
Andersen, T. (1991). The Reflecting Team. Dialogues and Dialogues About 
Dialogues. New York: W. W. Norton. . 
Anderson, H. (1997). Conversation, Language, and Possibz1ities. A Postmodern 
Approach 'to Therccpy. New York: Basic Books. 
Anderson, H., & Goolishian, H. (1986). Problem determined systems: 
towards transformation in family therapy. Journal of Strategic and 
Systemic Therapies, 5: 1~13. 
Anderson; H., & Goolishian, H. (1988). Human systems as linguistic sys-
tems: preliminary and evolvrng ideas about the :implications for clini-
cal theory. Family Process, 27: 371-393. 
Anderson, H., & Goolishian, H. (1990). Beyond cybernetics: comments on 
Atkinson & Heath's 'Further thoughts on second-order family ther-
apy'. Family Process, 29: 157-163. 
Anderson, H., & Goolishian, H. (1992). The client is the expert: a not-
knowing approach to therapy. In: S. McNamee & K J. Gergen (Eds.), 
Therapy as Social Construction (pp. 25-39). London: Sage. 
Atkinson, B., & Heath, A. (1990). Further thoughts on second-order family 
therapy-this time it's personal. Family Process, 29: 145-155. 
Auerswald, E. H. (1968). Interdisciplinary versus ecological approach. 
Family Process, 7: 202-215. 
Bakhtin, M. (1935). Discourse in the novel. In: M. Holquist (Ed.), The 
Dialogical Imagination. Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin (pp. 259-422). 
Austin, DC: University of Texas Press, 1981. 
Baldacchino, J-P. (2011). The eidetic of belonging: towards a phenomeno-
logical psychology of affect and ethno-national identity. Ethnicities, 11: 
8-106. 
Bateson, G. (1958). Naven. The Culture of the Iatmul People ofNw Guinea as 
Revealed Through a Study of the ''Naven'' Ceremonial. London: Wildwood 
House. 
Bateson, G. (1972a). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Collected Essays in 
Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology. London: Jason 
Aronson. 
Bateson, G. (1972b). Experiments in thinking about observed ethnological 
material. In: Steps to an Ecology of Mind (pp. 73-87). London: Jason 
Aronson. 
Bateson, G. (1972c). Bali: the value system of a steady state. In: Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind. Coll£cted Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution 
and Epistemology (pp. 107-127). London: Jason Aronson. 
28 CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Bateson, G. (1972d). Style, grace and information in primitive art. In: 
G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Collected EssltJjs in Anthr{lf'ology, 
Psychiatry, Evolution and Epistemology (pp. 128-152). London: Jason 
Aronson. 
Bateson, G. (1972e). Double bind. In: G. Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of 
Mind. Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution and 
Epistemology (pp. 271-279). London: Jason Aronson. 
Bateson, G. (1979). Mind and Nature. A Necessary Unity. London: Fontana. 
Bateson, G., & Bateson, M. C. (1987) Angels Fear. An Investigation into the 
Nature And Meaning of the Sacred. London: Rider. 
Benjamin, J. (1998). Shadow of the Other. Intersubjectivity and Gender in 
Psychoanalysis. New York: Routlege. 
Berger, M (1978). Beyond the Double Bind. New York: Brunner/Maze!. 
Bertrando, P. (2002). The presence of the third party: systemic therapy and 
transference analysis. Journal of Family Therapy, 24: 351-368. 
Bertrando.P. (2006). Expressed emotion and Milan systemic intervention: 
a pilot study. Journal of Family Therapy, 28: 81-102. 
Bertrando, P. (2007). The Dialogical Therapist. London: Kamac. 
Bertrando, P. (2010). Emotional positioning and the therapeutic process. 
Context, 107: 17-19. 
Bertrando, P., & Arcelloni, T. (2009). Anger and boredom: unpleasant 
emotions in systemic psy$otherapy. In: C. Flaskas & D. Pocock (Eds.), . 
Systems and Psychoanalysis: Contemporary Integrations in Family Therapy 
(pp. 75-92). London: Karnac. 
Bhabha, H. (1994). The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. 
Borneman, J., & Hammoudi, A. (Eds.) (2009). Being There. The Fieldwork 
Encounter and the Making of Truth. Berkeley, CA: University of Cali-
. fornia Press. 
Boscolo, L., & Bertrando, P. (1992). The reflexive loop of past, present and 
future in systemic therapy and consultation. Family Process, 31: 
119-130. 
Bourdieu, P. (2003). Participant objectivation. Journal of the Royal Anthro-
pological Institute, 9: 281-294. . 
Bowen, M (1978). Family Therapy in Clinical Practice. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Boyd-Franklin, N. (1989). Bla,k Families in Therapy. A Multisystems 
Approach. New York: Guilford Press. 
Burck, C. (20OS). Multilingual Living. Explorations of Language and Subjec-
tivity. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Burnham, J. (2005). Relational reflexivity: a tool for socially constructing 
therapeutic relationships. In: C. Flaskas, B. Mason, & A. Perlesz (Eds.), 
r 
( 
I 
I 
CULTURE AND THE REFLEXIVE SUBJECT IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 29 
The Space Between. Experience, Context, and Process in the Therapeutic 
Relationship (FE. 1-18). London: Kamac. 
Campbell, D., & Gi:0enbaek, M .. (2006). Taking Positions in the Organisation. 
London: Karnac. 
Carstens, J. (2004). After Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cecchin. G. (1987). Hypothesizing, circularity, and neutrality revisited: an 
invitation to curiOSity. Family Process, 26: 405-413. 
Cecchin, G., Lane, G., & Ray, W. (1994). The Cybernetic of Prejudices in the 
Practice of Psychotherapy. London: Kamac. 
Clifford, J., & Marcus, G. (Eds.) (1986). Writing Culture. The Poetics and 
Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Collini, S. (2010). BIahspeak. London Review of Books, 8 April, pp. 29-34. 
Crapanzano, V. (1992). Hermes' Dilemma & Hamlet's Desire. On the Epis-
temology of Interrmtation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Csordas, T. (2002). Body/Meaning/Healing. Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan. 
Dalal, F. (2002). Race, Colour and the Processes of Racialization. New Pers-
pectives from Group Analysis, pSychoanalysis and Sociology. Hove: 
Brunner-Routledge. 
Das, V. (2007). Life and Words. Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Davies, C. A. (1999). Reflexive Ethnography. A Guide to Researching Selves and 
Others. London: Routledge. 
Dell, P. (1982). Beyond homeostasis: toward a concept of coherence. Family 
Process, 21: 21-42. 
Dell, P., & Goolishian, H. (1981). Order through fluctuation: an evolution-
ary epistemology for human systems. Australian Journal of Family 
Therapy, 21: 75-184. 
DiNicola, V. (1997). A Stranger in the Faml1y. Culture, Families and Therapy. 
New York: W. W. Norton. 
Donovan, M. (2009). Reflecting processes and reflective functioning: 
shared concerns and challenges in systemic and psychoanalytic thera-
peutic practice. In: C. Flaskas & D. Pocock (Eds.), Systems and Psycho-
analysis. Contemporary Integrations in Family Therapy (pp. 149-166). 
London: Kamac. 
Epston, D., & White, M (1992). Experience, Contradiction, Narrative, & 
Imagination. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre. 
Ewing, K. (1997). Arguing Sainthood. Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and Islam. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Ewing, K. (2008). Stolen Honour. Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University .Press. 
30 CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
"Falicov, C. (Ed.) (1988). Family Transitions. Continuity & Clmnge over the Life 
Cycle. New York: Guilford Press. 
Falicov, C. (1995). Training to think cultorally: a multidimensional 
comparative framework. Family Process, 34: 389-399. 
Falicov, C. (1998a). From rigid borderlines to fertile borderlands: recon-
figuring family therapy. Journal of Marital & Family Therapy, 24: 
157-163. 
Falicov, C. (1998b). Latino Families in Therapy. New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Falicov, C. (2005). Emotional transnationalism and family identities. 
Family Process, 44: 399-406. 
Falicov, F. (2009). Commentary: on the wisdom and challenges of cultor-
ally attuned treatments for Latinos. Family Process, 48: 292-309. 
Fanon, F. (1952). Black Skin, White Masks. London: Pluto Press, 1986. 
Fine, M, & Turner, J. (1991). Tyranny and freedom: looking at ideas in the 
practice of family therapy. Family Process, 30: 307-320. 
Fisel<, G. (1991). A cross-cultural examination of proximity and hierarchy 
as dimensions of family structure. Family Process, 30: 121-133. 
Flaskas, C. (1996). Understanding the therapeutic relationship: using 
psychoanalytic ideas in the systemic context. In: C. Flaskas & A. Per-
lesz (Eds.), The Therapeutic Relationship in Systemic Therapy (pp. 34-52). 
London: Karnac. "-
Flaskas, C. (1997). Engagement and the therapeutic relationship in 
systemic therapy. Journal of Family Therapy, 19: 263--282. 
Flaskas, C. (2002). Family Therapy Beyond P~stmodernism. Practice, Clml-
lenges, Theory. Hove: Brunner Routledge. 
Flaskas, C. (2005). Sticky situations, therapy mess: on impasse and the 
therapist's position. In: C. Flaskas, B. Mason, & A. Perlesz (Eds.), The 
Space Between. Experience, Context, and Process in the Therapeutic Rela-
tionship (pp. 111-126). London: Karnac. 
Flaskas, C. (2009). Narrative, meaning-making 'and the unconscious. In: 
C. Flaskas & D. Pocock (Eds.), Systems and Psychoanalysis. Contemporary 
Integrations in Family Therapy (pp. 3--20). London: Karnac. 
Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2003). PsychocmaJ.ytic Theories: Perspectives from 
Developmental Psychology. London: Whurr. 
Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Fredman, G. (2004). Transforming Emotion: Conversations in Counselling and 
Psychotherapy. London: Whurr. 
Freedman, J., & Combs, G. (1996). Narrative Therapy. The Social Construction 
of Preferred Realities. New York: W. W. Norton. 
CULTURE AND TH~ REFLEXIVE SUBJEcr IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 31 
Frosh, S. (2009). What does the other want? In: C. Flaskas & D. Pocock 
(Eds.), Systems and Psychoanalysis. Contemporary Integrations in Family 
Therapy (pp. 185-202). London: Karnac. 
Geertz, C. (1988). Works and Lives. The Anthropologist as Author. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Golann, S. (1987). On description of family therapy. Family Process, 26: 
331-340. 
Goldner, V. (1988). Generation and gender: normative and cover hierar-
clUes. Famt1y Process, 27: 17-31. 
Goldner, V., Penn, P., Sheinberg, M., & Walker, G. (1990). Love and 
violence=._ gender paradoxes in volatile attachments. Family Process, 29: 
343-364. 
Graeber, D. (2007). Possibilities. Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion and Desire. 
Oakland, CA: AK Press. 
Guilfoyle, M. (2002). Power, knowledge and resistance in therapy: explor-
ing links between discourse and materiality. International Journal of 
Psychotherapy, 7: 83--97. 
Guilfoyle, M. (2003). Dialogue and power: a critical analysis of power in 
dialogical therapy. Family Process, 42: 331-343. 
Hall, C. (19%). Histories, empires and the post-colonial moment. In: 
l. Chambers & 1. Curti (Eds.), The Post-Colonial Question (pp. 65-77). 
London: Routledge. 
Hardy, K, & Laszloffy, T. (1995). The cultoral genograrn: key to training 
cultorally competent family therapists. Journal of Marital and Family 
Therapy, 21: 227-237. 
Hardy, K, & Laszloffy, T. (1998). The dynamics of pro-racist ideology: 
implications for family therapists. In: M. McGoldrick (Ed.), Revisioning 
Family Therapy. Race, Culture and Gender in Clinical Practice (pp. 11S-
128). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Harries-Jones, P. (1995). A Recursive Vision. Ecological Understanding and 
Gregory Bateson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Hastrup, K (2007). Performing the world: agency, anticipation and 
creativity. In: E. Haliam & T. Ingold (Eds.), Creativity and Cultural 
Improvisation (pp. 193--206). Oxford: Berg. 
Henderson, M (Ed.) (1995). Borders, Boundaries, and Frames. Cultural Criti-
cism and Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge. 
Hermans, H., & Kempen, H. (1993). The Dialogical Self: Meaning as 
Movement. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Hoffman,1. (1981). Foundations of Family Therapy. New York: Basic Books. 
Hoffman, 1. (1985). Beyond power and control: toward a "second order" 
family systems therapy. Family Systems Medicine, 3: 381-396. 
32 CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Hoffman-Hennessy, L., & Davis, J. (1993). Tekka with feathers: tailing 
about tailing (about suicide). In: S. Friedman (Ed.), The New Language 
of Change (pp. 345-373). New York: Guilford Press. 
Holland, D., & Lave, J. (Eds.) (2001). History in Person. Enduring Struggles, 
Contentious Practice, Intimate Identities. Santa Fe, NM: School of Ameri-
can Research Press. 
Holquist, M. (1990). Dialogism: Bakhtin and his World. New York: 
Routledge. 
Inger,!., & Inger, J. (1994). Creating and Ethical Position in Famz1y Therapy. 
London: Karnac. 
Jenkins, R (1997). Rethinking Ethnicity. Arguments and Explorations. 
London: Sage. 
Khanna, R (2003). Dark Continents. Psychoanalysis and Colonialism. Dur-
ham, NC: Duke Uuiversity Press. 
Kitzinger, c., &: Wilkinson, S. (1996). Theorizing representing the other. In: 
S. Wilkinson & C. Kitzinger (Eds.), Representing the Other. A Feminism 
& Psychology Reader (pp. 1-32). London: Sage. 
Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, 27: 99-110. 
Krause, I.-B. (1993). Anthropology and family therapy: a case for emo-
tions. Journal of Family Therapy, 15: 35-56. 
Krause, I.-B. (1998). Ther"Pfj Across Culture. London: Sage. 
Krause, I.-B. (2002). Culture and System in Family Therapy. London: Kamac. 
Krause, I.-B. (2007). Reading Naven: toward the integration of culture in 
systemic psychotherapy. Human Systems: The Journal of Systemic Con-
sultation & Management, 18: 112-125. 
Krause, I.-B. (2009). In the thick of culture: systemic and psychoanalytic 
ideas. In: C. Flaskas & D. Pocock (Eds.), Systems and Psychoanalysis. 
Contemporary Integrations in Family Therapy (pp. 167-184). London: 
Karnac. 
Krause, I.-B. (2010a). "I feel therefore ... ": being there in systemic psycho-
therapy practice. Context, 107: 4-7. 
Krause, I.-B. (2010b). Calling the context: towards a systemic and cross-
cultural approach to emotions. Journal of Family Therapy, 32: 370-397. 
Lamer, G. (2000). Towards common ground in psychoanalysis and family 
therapy: on knowing not to know .. Journal of Family Therapy, 22: 61-82. 
Luepnitz, D. (2009). Jriterpreting dreams in psychotherapy with couples: 
moving between upper and lower worlds. In: C. Flaskas & D. Pocock 
(Eds.), Systems and PsychoanalySis. Contemporary Integrations in Family 
,Therapy (pp. 57-72). London: Kamac. 
CULTURE AND THE REFLEXIVE SUBJECT IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 33 
Malik, R, & Krause, I.-B. (2005). Before and beyond words: embodiment 
and intercultural therapeutic relationships in family therapy. In: 
C. Flaskas, B. Mason, & A:Perlesz (Eds.), The Space Between. Experience, 
CO'!ctext, and Process in the Therapeutic Relationship (pp. 95-110). London: 
Karnac. 
Mason, B. (1993). Towards positions of safe uncertainty. Human Systems: 
The Journal of Systemic Consultation & MJznagement, 4: 189-200. 
Mattingly, C. (2008). Reading minds and telling tales in a cultural border-
land. Ethos, 36: 136-154. 
Maturana, H., & Verala, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and Recognition. Dordrect: 
Kluwer Academic. 
McGoldrick, M (Ed.) (1998). Re-Visioning Family Therapy. Race, Culture, and 
Gender in Clinical Practice. New York: Guilford Press. 
McGoldrick, M., Pearce, J., & Giordano, J. (Eds.) (1982). Ethnicity and 
Family Therapy. New York: Guilford. 
McKinnon, L., & Miller, D. (1987). The new epistemology and the Milan 
approach: feminist and socio-political consideration. Journal of Marilal 
and Family Therapy, 13: 139-156. 
Milton, K (2002). Loving Nature. Towards an Ecology of Emotion. London: 
Routledge. 
Mimic., J. (Ed.) (2007). Explorations in Psychoanalytic Ethnography. New 
York: Berghan. 
Minuchin, S., & Fishman, H. C. (1981). Family Therapy Techniques. 
Cambridge, 11A: Harvard University Press. 
Moore, H. (2007). The Subject of Anthropology.' Gendsr, Symbolism and 
Psychoanalysis. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Montalvo, E., & Gutierrez, M. (1988). The emphasis on cultural identity: 
a developmental-ecological constraint. In: C. Falicov (Ed), Family 
Transitions. Continuity & Change over the Life Cycle (pp. 181-210). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Morgan, A. (2000). What is Narrative Therapy? An Easy-to-Read Introduction. 
Adelaide: Dulwich Centre. 
Nuckolls, C. (1996). The Cultural Dialectics of Knowledge and Desire. 
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Pearce, W. E., & Cronen, V. E. (1980). Communication, Action and Meaning: 
The Creation of Social Realities. New York: Praeger. 
Pocock, D. (1997). Feeling understood in family therapy. Journal of Family 
Therapy, 19: 283-302. 
Pocock, D. (2005). Systems of the heart: evoking the feeling self in family 
therapy. In: C Flaskas, B. Mason,& A. Perlesz (Eds.), ·The Space 
34 CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Between. Experience, Context, and Process in the Therapeutic Relationship 
(pp. 127-140). London: Karnac. 
PocoCk, D. (2006). Six things worth understanding about psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy. Journal of Family Thera:py, 28: 352-369. 
PocoCk; D. (2009). Working with emotional systems: four new maps. In: C. 
Flaskas & D. PocoCk (Eds.), Systems and Psyclwtmalysis. Contemparary 
Integrations in Family Thera:py (pp. 93-110). London: Kamac. 
PocoCk, D. (2010a). Editorial: emotion as a systemic issue. Context, 107: 
1-3. 
PocoCk, D. (2010b). Emotions as eco-systemic adaptations. Journal ofFamz1y 
Thera:py, 32: 362-378. 
Rabinow, P. (2008). Mm-king Time. On the Anthropology of the Contemporary. 
'Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rabinow, P., & Marcus, G. (2008). Designs for an Anthropology of the 
Contemporary. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Real, T. (1990). The therapeutic use of self in constructionist/systemic 
therapy. Family Process, 29: 255-272. . 
Rober, P. (1999). The therapist's inner conversation in family therapy prac-
tice: some ideas about the self of the therapist, therapeutic impasse and 
the process of reflectioIL Family Process, 38: 209-228. 
Rober, P. (2005). The therapist's self in dialogical family therapy: some 
ideas about not-knovving af!.d the therapist's inner conversation. Family 
Process, 44: 477-495. ' 
Rober, P., & Seltzer, M. (2010) .. Avoiding colonizer positions in the ther-
apy room. Family Process, 49: 123-i37. 
Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient. London: 
Penguin. 
Seikkula, J. (2003). Dialogue is the change: understanding psychotherapy 
as a semiotic process of Bakhtin, Voloshinov and Vygotsky. Human 
Systems: The Journal of Systemic Consultation & Management, 14: 83-94. 
Seikkula, J., Arnkil, T., & Eriksson, E. (2003). Postmodern society and 
social networka: open and anticipation dialogues in network meetings. 
Famz1y Process, 42: 185-203. 
Segal, H. (1994). Straight Sex: The Politics of Pleasure. London: Virago. 
Selvini Palazzoli, M., Boscolo, L., Cecchin, G., & Prata, G. (1978). Paradox 
and Counterparadox. A New Model in the Thera:py of the Famz1y in Schizo-
phrenic Transaction. New York: Jason Aronson. 
Selvini Palazzoli, M., Boscolo, L., Cecchin, G., & Prata, G. (1980). 
Hypothesizing-drcularity-neutrality: three guidelines for the conduc-
tor of the session. Family Process, 19: 3-12. 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
CULTURE AND THE REFLEXIVE SUBJECT IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 35 
Selvini Palazzoli, M., Cirillo, S., Selvini, M., & Sorrentino, A. (1989). Family 
Games: General Models of Psychotic Processes in the Family. New York: 
W. W. Norton. 
Singh, R, & Oarke, G. (2006). Power and parenting assessments: the inter-
secting levels of culture, race, class and gender. Clinical Child Psy-
chology & PsychiJ:ztry, 11: 9-25. 
Strathern, M. (1988). The Gender of the Gift. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Strathem, M. (1992): After Nature. English Kinship in the Late Twentieth 
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Strathem, M (1999). Property, Substance & Effect. Anthropological Essays on 
Persons and Things. London: Athlone Press. 
Tamura, T., & Lau, A. (1992). Connectedness versus separateness: applic-
ability of family therapy to Japanese families. Family Process, 31: 319-
340. 
Taylor, c. (1985a). Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers I. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1985b). Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 
II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tomm, K (1984). One perspective on the Milan systemic approach. Part I. 
Overview of development, theory and practice. Journal of Morital and 
Family Thera:py, 10: 113-125. 
Tomm, K (1987a). Interventive interviewing: Part !. Strategizing as a 
fourth guideline for the therapist. Family Process, 26: 3-13. 
Tomm, K (1987b). Interventive interviewing: Part II. Reflexive question-
ing as a means to enable self-heeling. Family Process, 26: 167-183. 
Tomm, K (1988). Interventive interviewing: Part m. Intending to ask 
lineal, circular, strategic or reflexive questions? Family Process, 27: 1-
15. 
'. Turner, V. (1969). The Ritual Process. Structure and Anti-Structure. New 
BrunswiCk, NJ: Aldine Transactions, 2009. 
Watts-Jones, D. (1997). Toward an African American Genogram. Family 
Process, 36: 375-383. 
Watts-Jones, D. (2002). Healing internalized racism: the role of a within-
group sanctuary among people of African descent. Family Process, 41: 
591-601. 
Werbner, P., & Modood, T. (Eds.) (1997). Debating Cultural Hybridity. 
Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism. London: Zed 
Books. 
White, M. (1997). Narratives of Therapists' Lives. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre. 
36 CULTURE AND REFLEXIVITY IN SYSTEMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Whitehead, A (1925). Science and the Modem World. New York: Free Press, 
1967. 
Wilder-Mott, c., & Weakland, J. (Eds.) (1981). Rigor and Imagination. New 
York: Praeger. 
Wilson, J. (2007). The Performance of Practice. London: Karnac. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and Reality. London: Routledge, 2006. 
ZiZe!<; S. (1989). The Sublime Object ofIdeowgy. London: Verso. 
t 
PART I 
THE INTERSUBJECTIVE SPACE 
I 
